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In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Bias argued that the district court erred when it failed
to appoint substitute counsel in regard to his Rule 35 motion and his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea because his trial counsel was operating under an actual conflict of
interest. This brief is necessary to address several of the State's arguments, including
but not limited to, its argument that Mr. Bias never requested the appointment of
substitute counsel in

to his Rule 35 motion and that

has no right to conflict

free counsel in regard to

of his post-judgment motions.

r. Bias argues that his

request for substitute

encompassed his Rule 35

because he requested

substitute counsel as to "all issues" remaining in his case.

Mr. Bias also argues that

Idaho case law establishes a right to conflict free counsel during post-judgment
proceedings. Moreover, it would be unwise and incompatible with the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct to hold that attorneys in Idaho can represent clients when an
actual conflict of interest exists.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Bias' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

1.

Did the district court err when it denied
Bias' motion
the appointment of
new counsel to represent tlim in regard to his Rule
motion and his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea?
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
ten years, with five years fixed, upon Mr. Bias following his plea of guilty to a
felony DUI? 1

1

Mr. Bias will not address Issue II in this Reply Brief.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bias' Motion For The Appointment Of New
Counsel To Represent Him In Regard To His Rule 35 Motion And His Motion To
Withdraw His Guilty Plea
The State opens its Respondent's Brief with a footnote indicating that Mr. Bias'
motion for the appointment of substitute counsel did not encompass the appointment of
substitute counsel in regard to his Rule 35 motion. (Respondent's Brief, p.6, n.1.) The
State goes on to argue that due to this failure, the issue of whether the district court
abused its discretion when it failed to appoint substitute counsel in regard to Mr. Bias'
motion was not preserved for appeal. (Respondent's Brief, p.6, n.1.)
The

ment is not supported by the record, as it completely disregards

language employed by Mr. Bias in his motion for the appointment of substitute
counsel. In the affidavit Mr. Bias filed in support of his motion for the appointment of
substitute counsel, he wrote that due to his lack of legal training "litigation may become
[too] complex for me to be able to adequately argue any and all issues that may present
themselves in my case." 2

(Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Supporting

Information, (01/09/14 Augmentation), p.1 (emphasis added).) Contrary to the State's
assertion, the foregoing request for substitute counsel was in regard to "all" the "issues"
in Mr. Bias' case.

This all encompassing language does not restrict the request for

counsel in regard to the motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

2

As such, Mr. Bias did

The basis for the request for substitute counsel was Mr. Bias' assertion that "[c]ounsel
was previously appointed in [his] case and [he] believe[s] said Counsel failed to
adequately argue defenses for [his] benefit and . . . caused the Attorney/Client
relationship to become irreparably damaged." (Motion for Appointment of Counsel and
Supporting Information, (01/09/14 Augmentation), p.2.)

3

request the appointment of substitute counsel in regard to both his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea and his Rule 35 motion requesting leniency.
Additionally, once a conflict between an attorney and a client arises, that conflict
precludes the attorney from representing the client in unrelated matters, let alone the
same matter where the direct conflict lies. The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct
forth the basic rules governing conflicts of interest. State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 98
(1998). A comment to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1. 7, which controls conflicts
of interest with current clients, provides guidance. That comment states the following:
Loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation
directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Thus,
absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter
against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when
The client as to whom the
the matters are wholly unrelated.
representation is directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the
resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the
lawyer's ability to represent the client effectively.
I.R.P.C. 1.7 cmt. 6. As such, when Mr. Bias claimed his trial counsel was ineffective in
the criminal case, that actual conflict prevented trial counsel form representing Mr. Bias
in regard to the entire criminal case.· Even assuming the State is correct in its assertion
that Mr. Bias did not expressly request substitute counsel in regard to his Rule 35
motion, a general request for the appointment of counsel is not issue-specific, as the
United States Supreme Court presumes "that the defendant requests the lawyer's
services at every critical stage 3 of the prosecution." Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,
633 & n.6 (1986).

3

See State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 523 (Ct. App. 1994) ("A criminal defendant has a
right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule
35 motion.").
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The

then
the district

moot,

that the issues raised in Mr. Bias' Appellant's Brief are
did not address the merits of his motion to withdraw his

guilty plea and he did not challenge this disposition of the motion to withdraw his guilty
plea on appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.?-9.) The State's argument is misplaced for
two reasons. First, it ignores the fact that trial counsel continued to represent Mr. Bias
in regard to his Rule 35 motion while an actual conflict of interest existed. Second, the
district court should not have made any decision in regard to the motion to withdraw the
guilty plea without first ruling on the request for the appointment of substitute counsel.
See Wade, 125 Idaho at 523 ("When a court is presented with a request for appointed
counsel, the court must address that request before rendering a ruling on the
substantive issues in the underlying case.").
The

then argues that Mr. Bias has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in

regard to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, so the district court had no duty to
inquire into Mr. Bias' claim that the attorney-client relationship was irreparably
damaged. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-1 0.) In support of this position, the State relies on
State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454 (Ct. App. 2010), where the Court of Appeals held that
a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not a "critical stage" for purposes of
the Sixth Amendment and, therefore, a defendant has no constitutional right to an
attorney to pursue such a motion. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-1 0.) The State's reliance
on Hartshorn is misplaced because it ignores a critical distinction highlighted in that
Opinion.

Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that Hartshorn only raised a Sixth

Amendment right to counsel claim and did not raise a statutory right to counsel claim
pursuant to I.C. § 19-852(b).

Hartshorn, 149 Idaho at 457-458 n.2.
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As such, that

Opinion did not
Mr.

under I

Hartshorn's statutory right to counsel under I. C. § 19-852(b ).
his right

§

19~852(b ),

counsel under

the Harlshorn Opinion is not controlling. Moreover, Harlshom

provides very little guidance, if any, in this matter
insistence that I.C. § 1

the Sixth Amendment and

the Idaho Supreme Court's

"statutory right to counsel would be a hollow right if it did

not guarantee the defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel," with the Court
continuing, "We can see no legitimate basis for determining whether there has been a
violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by I.C. § '19-852
differently from determining whether there has
right." Hernandez v.
The State then

127 Idaho 685,

a violation of a similar constitutional
(1995).

that the appointment

counsel during post-judgment

proceedings is discretionary and, as such, the district court had no duty to "safeguard
the constitutional right to conflict free counsel" during the post-judgment proceedings in
this matter. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-14.) The State cites to Murphy v. State, 2014
Opinion No.24 (Feb. 25, 2014) (not yet final), for the proposition that when the district
court has the discretion to appoint counsel there is no constitutionally protected right to
counsel after a discretionary appointment has been made. (Respondent's Brief, pp.1114.) The State's reliance on Murphy is misplaced because that case dealt with postconviction proceedings under the Uniform Post Conviction Post-Conviction Procedure
Act (hereinafter, UPCA), I.C. § 19-4901 et seq., and this case deals with two postjudgment motions in the direct criminal proceedings.

This distinction is important

because a post-conviction action pursuant to the UPCA is deemed a civil action which is
a true collateral attack on the defendant's conviction.
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For example, In Murphy, the

Idaho Supreme Court relied on Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U

(1987), where the

Finley court held:
Postconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than is
discretionary direct review. It is not part of the criminal proceeding itself,
and it is in fact considered to be civil in nature. It is a collateral attack that
normally occurs only after the defendant has failed to secure relief through
direct review of his conviction. States have no obligation to provide this
avenue of relief, and when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by
the Due Process Clause does not require that the State supply a lawyer
as well.
/d. at

556~557

(internal citations omitted).

Thus, in Finley, the Court was not

considering application of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel or a co-extensive
statutory right to counsel; rather, it was concerned with the question of whether a postconviction petitioner has a Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel in a collateral attack
on a conviction. As such, Murphy is inapposite because that Opinion was dealing with
different proceedings and different rights than those

issue in this matter.

Another problem with the State's analogy to UPCA post-conviction proceedings
and post-judgment proceedings in the direct criminal case is that Idaho has recognized
a right to effective assistance of counsel during the latter proceedings. In Murphy the
Idaho Supreme Court reasoned that since there is no right to counsel in post-conviction
proceedings, then there can be no deprivation of the right to effective assistance of
counsel in said proceedings. Murphy, at pp.?-8. Based on that logic, if there is a right
to effective assistance of counsel during post-judgment proceedings, then there must be
a correlative right to counsel during the same proceedings. In Idaho, there is a Sixth
Amendment and a co-extensive statutory right to counsel during Rule 35 proceedings.
As mentioned above, the Court of Appeals held in Wade that "A criminal defendant has
a right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule

7

motion." Wade, 1
citied to Murray v.

Idaho

In support of this proposition, the
918 (Ct. App. ·1

1

where

Court
Court held

that "a claim of ineffective assistance if counsel, based upon counsel's alleged failure to
a Rule 35 motion, properly may

" /d. at 924-925.

brought under the

post~conviction

procedures

Since there is right to effective assistance of counsel while

pursuing Rule 35 relief, there is a correlative right to counsel during Rule 35
proceedings.
Additionally, the primary policy rationales behind the holding in Murphy, i.e.
judicial economy and finality of judgments, are not applicable in the context of
judgment motions. In Murphy,

post~

Idaho Supreme Court overruled prior precedent in

Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591 (1981), where it was held that a UPCA petitioner

could file a successive petition and allege that his/her post-conviction counsel was
ineffective. Murphy, at 5-8. In doing so, the Idaho Supreme Court cited to Bejarano v.
Warden, 929 P.2d 922, 925 (Nev. 1996), for the proposition that the ability to file

successive post-conviction petitions has allowed post-conviction petitioners to make "a
sham out of the system of justice and thwarted imposition of their ultimate penalty with
continuous petitions for relief," and, due to this problem, the State "cannot guarantee
every defendant effective counsel for every claim that may be raised." /d. at 8. These
concerns are not triggered by the post-judgment motions at issue in this case because
Rule 35 motions and motions to withdraw guilty pleas cannot be filed ad infinitum. The
plain language of Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) states that "no defendant may file more
than one motion seeking a reduction of sentence under this Rule." I.C.R. 35(b). This
limitation has been strictly interpreted by the Court of Appeals and even motions to

8

reconsider a previously filed Rule

motion have been prohibitecJ. State v. Battens,

137 Idaho 730, 732-733 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Today we

explicit that a motion to

reconsider the denial of a Rule 35 motion is an improper successive motion and is
prohibited by Rule 35."). Moreover, if a defendant files a motion to withdraw his/her
guilty plea in a direct criminal case, the defendant cannot raise the same claim in postconviction proceedings.

Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 863 (Ct. App. 1995).

Further, a district court loses jurisdiction to entertain a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
"once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or
affirmance of the judgment on appeal." State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 354 (2003).
Additionally, the State fails to provide any policy rationale in support of
argument that the discretionary appointment of counsel under I. C. § 18-852(b)

not

carry with it an implied promise of effectiveness. Regardless of whether counsel was
appointed as a matter of right or in an exercise of the district court's discretion, the lay
petitioner should be able to rely upon the competence of his/her attorney. And when a
defendant relies upon that attorney to the defendant's own detriment, it is patently unfair
to penalize the defendant for counsel's errors-regardless of the reason why the
attorney was appointed in the first instance. Further, as in this case, it is exceptionally
unreasonable to hold that Mr. Bias should not be able to rely on his counsel because he
had the same attorney throughout the entirety of the criminal proceedings.

Mr. Bias

cannot fathom why he should stop trusting his attorney after the judgment of conviction
has been entered. This undermines the credibility of the Idaho State Bar and the legal
profession as a whole.
Conduct.

It is also inconsistent with the Idaho Rules of Professional

This case is especially egregious because trial counsel was representing
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Mr.

an existing conflict of interest. What is the point of appointing cou

if

counsel can be incompetent and actively advocate against the
in a
then argues, in the alternative, that even if Mr. Bias has a right to
counsel in

to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court avoided any

conflict of interest when it declined to address the merits of that motion, preventing trial
counsel from having to litigate his own performance. (Respondent's Brief, pp.14-16.)
Contrary to the State's assertion, trial counsel was still acting under a

of interest

when he continued to represent Mr. Bias in regard to his Rule 35 motion. 5 As argued
above, once an actual conflict of interest has been identified, I.R.P.C 1.7 precludes that
attorney from representing the client in that matter and unrelated matters, absent the
client's written consent. Moreover, the United State's Supreme Court presumes that a

4

Mr. Bias is not asserting that his trial counsel was intentionally advocating against his
interests. However, if there is no right to counsel during post-judgment proceedings,
appointed counsel could actively argue against the client during those proceedings. In
the event this occurred, the defendant would be left with no remedy other than filing a
bar complaint or suing the attorney for malpractice, which is a course of action that one
judge from the Idaho Court of Appeals has previously frowned upon. See Mellinger v.
State, 113 Idaho 31, 35 (Ct. App. 1987) (Burnett, J., concurring) ("If he is denied
effective assistance of counsel, and as a result he inadequately raises grounds for relief
in his application to the court, he may file a subsequent application reasserting the
grounds more fully. See I.C. § 19-4908. Thus, if a prisoner filed a timely application
but it was dismissed due to ineffective assistance of counsel, I believe the prisoner
would be entitled to file a subsequent application asserting his grounds for relief more
fully even though the five-year period of limitation under I.C. § 19-4902 had elapsed in
the meantime. To hold otherwise would leave the prisoner with no alternative than to
sue the attorney for malpractice-a distasteful and onerous undertaking-or to seek a
writ of habeas corpus from a federal court, producing the very kind of outside
interference in state judicial processes that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act was
intended to avoid.").
5
Mr. Bias surmises that the State did not address the conflict of interest issue in regard
to the Rule 35 motion, because of its previous assertion that Mr. Bias' request for the
appointment of counsel did not encompass the Rule 35 motion.
10

request for
criminal proceed

includes a request for counsel during all critical

of the

Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 & n.6 (1986). Finally,

the district court should have addressed the request for substitute counsel before
dismissing Mr. Bias' motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Wade, 125 Idaho at 523.
In sum, Mr. Bias requested the appointment of new counsel in regard to all of the
issues in his case which encompassed his Rule 35 motion.

The State's analogy to

Murphy for the proposition that there is no right to counsel during post-judgment
proceedings in a direct criminal action runs afoul of Idaho case law which holds that a
rule

proceeding is a critical stage for Sixth Amendment purposes. Moreover, from a

policy perspective the notion that an attorney need not be either competent or bound by
the Rules of Professional Responsibility during post-judgment proceedings undermines
the credibility of both the Idaho State

and the legal professional as a whole. This in

turn undermines the credibility of the Idaho Judiciary, as it controls the minimal ethical
standards required of attorneys practicing in the State of Idaho.

As such, Mr. Bias

contends that it would be unwise to extend the holding in Murphy, which is not yet final,
to post-judgment criminal proceedings.
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CONCLUSION

Mr. Bias

requests that this Court remand this matter for further

proceedings and instructions to appoint substitute counsel.

Alternatively, Mr. Bias

respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter for further proceedings and
instructions to conduct the appropriate inquiries regarding Mr. Bias' request for
substitute counsel. Alternatively, Mr. Bias respectfully requests that this Court reduce
the fixed portion of his sentence.
DATED this 51h day of June, 2014.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy
Appellate Public Defender
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